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PYRRHIC VICTORY: SMITH V. CITY OF SALEM AND
THE TITLE VII RIGHTS OF TRANSSEXUALS
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a veteran police officer named Philecia
Barnes.' After passing the sergeant's exam, you start your probation-
ary period. 2 But your supervisors repeatedly tell you that you are not
"masculine enough" to be an effective sergeant.3 You become the
first candidate for sergeant in seven years to fail the probationary pe-
riod,4 even though a member of your class with lower evaluation
scores passed.5 You believe your employer has discriminated against
you because you do not fulfill sex stereotypes,6 so you want to file a
Title VII claim.7 Imagine now that you were born Phillip, and that
you were "a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual" when you
went through your probationary period.8
Because you are a transsexual, 9 you will likely lose your Title VII
sex discrimination claim, unless you bring suit in the Sixth Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Smith v. City of Salem10 marked the
1. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 733 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 624 (2005).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 735.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-57 (1989); see also infra notes 86-97
and accompanying text.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ... .
8. Barnes, 401 F.3d at 733.
9. The term "transsexual" refers to people with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), defined as
"a strong and persistent cross-gender identification." AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 532 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
People with GID have "persistent discomfort about [their] assigned sex or a sense of inappropri-
ateness in the gender role of that sex." Id. at 533. The term "transsexual" is a nontechnical,
broad term, which describes people whose gender identities do not match their biological sex.
Shannon Minter, Nat'l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, Representing Transsexual Clients: Selected Le-
gal Issues (Oct. 2003), http://www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/translaw.htm. Because the Sixth
Circuit and other circuits use "transsexual" in most of the discussed cases, this Note will follow
suit unless quoting or referring to a source that uses a different term.
10. 378 F.3d 566, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2004) (amended opinion).
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first time a federal court extended Title VII protection against sex dis-
crimination based on sex stereotypes to transsexual plaintiffs.11
This Note addresses the conflict over the applicability of Title VII
to transsexual plaintiffs and argues that the Sixth Circuit erred in
reaching its conclusion. Part II examines the legislative history of Ti-
tle VII as it pertains to sex discrimination, and summarizes Title VII
sex discrimination cases involving transsexual plaintiffs.12 Part III de-
tails the Sixth Circuit's decision in Smith v. City of Salem,13 while Part
IV analyzes its reasoning.14 Part V predicts the likely impact of the
decision; it suggests that transsexuals and their supporters lobby for
local and state antidiscrimination laws that specifically protect
transsexuals. 15 It also cautions that continued Title VII litigation
under Smith's reasoning could provoke Congress to amend Title VII
and explicitly exclude transsexuals. 16
II. BACKGROUND
This Part discusses the legislative history of Title VII as it pertains
to sex discrimination.' 7 It then introduces the legal difficulties
transsexuals face in the United States.' 8 Finally, it summarizes rele-
vant case law regarding Title VII and transsexual plaintiffs.' 9
A. Legislative History of Title VII's Prohibition of
Sex Discrimination
Title VII is part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and it specifically
addresses employment discrimination:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 20
11. Dee McAree, Courts Still at Odds over Transsexuals' Rights (Aug. 10, 2005), http://www.
law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1123578315284; see also Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748,
750 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th
Cir. 1977); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *4 (E.D. La.
Sept. 16, 2002).
12. See infra notes 17-97 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 98-120 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 121-182 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 183-214, 226-235.
16. See infra notes 215-225.
17. See infra notes 20-29.
18. See infra notes 30-43.
19. See infra notes 44-97.
.20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). This section also makes it unlawful
"to limit, segregate, or classify ... employees or applicants for employment in any way which
1102 [Vol. 56:1101
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The legislative history regarding the Title VII provision prohibiting
sex discrimination is sparse.2' Representative Howard Smith, a Dem-
ocrat from Virginia who many considered an opponent of the Civil
Rights Act, introduced the amendment that added "sex" as a basis
upon which employers could not discriminate. 22 He did this the day
before the House was to vote on Title VII.23 Smith said the amend-
ment was needed "to prevent discrimination against another minority
group, the women. ' 24 The amendment passed, as did Title VII. Be-
cause the amendment was introduced after an earlier version of Title
VII had been debated, 25 the official legislative history does not in-
clude the usual findings of facts that would shed light on what was
meant by "sex."'26 In 1972, Congress passed the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act, which made amendments to Title VII but "left the
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
21. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that there is a "total
lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment"); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667
F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659,
662 (9th Cir. 1977); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975); see
also Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept.
16, 2002).
22. Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 443
(1966).
23. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090.
24. Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public
Policy, 9 LAW & INEO. 163, 163 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 110 CONG.
REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Howard Smith)). There is considerable debate regarding
the motive behind Smith's amendment. Charles and Barbara Whalen write, "Smith counted on
the amendment passing and making [the Civil Rights Act of 1964] so controversial that eventu-
ally it would be voted down either in the House or Senate." CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA
WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS Acr
116 (1985). Freeman disagrees:
This view, appealing though it seems, ignores several factors apparent to anyone who
has tried to influence a Congressional vote: 1) The potential beneficiaries of the
amendment-women-had experienced lobbyists on the Hill and were not uninter-
ested in the bill; 2) most Southerners had conceded defeat and gone home by Wednes-
day; the vote occurred on a Saturday, which is not Members' favorite day to be in
Washington; 3) the number of Members voting on the amendment-301-was larger
than any other counted vote that day (the others ranged from 178 to 240); 4) other
amendments which might "clutter up" the bill, including "sex" amendments to other
titles, were voted down.
Freeman, supra, at 164-65 (citation omitted).
25. Miranda Oshige McGowan, Against Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 711, 719 n.30
(2005) (noting that "[b]ecause 'sex' was added as an amendment, the House Report said nothing
about sex discrimination").
26. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090.
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language of § 2000e-2(a)(1) unchanged. '27 Title VII was again
amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 28
which explicitly stated that the phrase "because of sex" prohibited
employers from discriminating against women because of pregnancy
and childbirth. 29
B. Legal Difficulties Faced by Transsexuals
People who identify themselves as transsexuals face numerous legal
and societal difficulties. 30 In addition to being victims of "pervasive
discrimination,"' 31 "transgender people are disproportionately affected
by poverty. '32 Discrimination abounds in "housing, public accommo-
dations, credit, marriage, parenting and law enforcement. ' 33 Employ-
27. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he clear intent
of the 1972 legislation was to remedy the economic deprivation of women as a class.").
28. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).
29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); accord In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Prac-
tices Litig., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143 (D. Neb. 2005) ("Congress enacted the PDA in 1978 to
overrule the Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, holding that an em-
ployer's denial of coverage for pregnancy-related conditions in an otherwise comprehensive
health insurance plan did not violate Title VII." (citations omitted)).
30. Dr. Connie Wheeler has "commented on the nature of gender identity disorder/
transsexualism":
[H]istories of psychiatric treatment for substance abuse, adjustment disorders, serious
suicidal thoughts, and depression are not uncommon in [patients with GID] .... [But]
[mlany of these disorders are defense mechanism[s] against the frustration, psychologi-
cal pain, anxiety, and discrimination stemming from patients' inability to live safely and
comfortably in society with their condition or in their desired gender roles.
Connie Wheeler et al., Gender Identity Disorders, in 2 TREATMENT OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS
(Glen 0. Gabbard ed., 1995) (quoted in Manago v. Barnhart, 321 F. Supp. 2d 559, 565 (E.D.N.Y.
2004)). There is disagreement regarding the rate of transsexuality-Manago cites a figure of
"one male per 30,000," while another authority estimates "one in 11,900 persons 'born male' and
one in 30,400 persons 'born female."' Compare Manago, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 564, with Neil Dish-
man, The Expanding Rights of Transsexuals in the Workplace, 21 LAB. LAW. 121, 122 (2005).
31. MORGAN BASSICHis, NAT'L CTR. ON LESBIAN RIGHTS, "IT'S WAR IN HERE": A REPORT
ON THE TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX PEOPLE IN NEW YORK STATE PRISONS 1,
7 (2001) (reporting that "anti-transgender bias is ... present in 13% of all bias incidents" and
that transgender people are "disproportionately poor, homeless, and incarcerated"). A 2000
survey of transgendered people in Washington, D.C. found that "nearly 30% of respondents
reported having no income at all, and another 32% reported earning $10,000 or less per year."
Id. at 9. One website lists and provides information about dozens of transgendered people who
were, or are suspected of having been, murdered. Remembering Our Dead, http://www.
rememberingourdead.org/# (last visited Apr. 30, 2007).
32. Franklin H. Romeo, Note, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New Conception of
Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 714 (2005).
33. Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judi-
cial and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 37-38
(2000) [hereinafter Currah & Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions] (discussing efforts to address the
scope of discrimination and lack of legal protections for the transgendered); accord PAISLEY
CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A
HANDBOOK FOR Acr'IlSTS AND POLICYMAKERS 11 (2000), available at http://www.thetaskforce.
1104
SMITH v. CITY OF SALEM
ment discrimination is of particular significance to transsexuals
because its effects are felt beyond the workplace. Indeed, employ-
ment discrimination only exacerbates the economic hardships that
transsexuals already face when trying to secure housing and health
care.
34
In addition to their relatively consistent exclusion from Title VII
protection, transsexuals have also been excluded from civil rights stat-
utes dealing with disabilities. 35 The Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) 36 and the Rehabilitation Act of 197337 explicitly exclude
"transvestism, transsexualism ... [and] gender identity disorders not
resulting from physical impairments"38 from their protections, despite
the medical community's widespread acceptance of Gender Identity
Disorder (GID) as a medical condition.39 Thus, there is no cause of
action under either Act for discrimination based on transsexuality.
Title VII challenges to discrimination against the transgendered
"ha[ve] proved to be a singularly unsuccessful route to winning basic
civil rights protections. ' 40 Professor Richard Storrow notes the
problems faced by transsexual plaintiffs asserting claims of employ-
ment discrimination:
Employment discrimination jurisprudence at both the federal and
state levels . . . captures transsexuals in a discourse of exclusion
from social participation. This wide net, cast using a remarkably
refined system of semantic manipulations, snags all claims launched
org/downloads/reports/reportsTransgenderEquality.pdf [hereinafter CURRAH & MINTER,
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY]; John M. Broder, Police Mistreatment of Gay Men Is Called Com-
mon, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005, at A16 (reporting an Amnesty International study finding mis-
treatment of transsexuals, including "verbal and physical abuse, inappropriate body searches,
beatings and rapes, and failure to protect people in holding cells"); Human Rights Campaign:
Transgender Basics, http://www.hrc.org/Content/NavigationMenu/HRC/GetInformed/Issues/
TransgenderIssuesl/TransgenderBasics/TransgenderBasics.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2007).
34. CURRAH & MINTER, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 33, at 11 (discussing the legal
and social issues facing the transgendered).
35. Minter, supra note 9.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2000).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F)(i) (2000).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F)(i). Homosexuality and bisexuality were
also excluded. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(E). Behaviors that are typically crimi-
nal were included in the same subsection as transsexuality: "pedophilia, exhibitionism, [and]
voyeurism." 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F)(i). Senator Jesse Helms was con-
cerned the ADA would prevent employers from using their "own moral standards" when screen-
ing job applicants and insisted these exclusions be included. 135 CONG. REC. S10765, 10765
(daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989).
39. DSM-IV, supra note 9, at 532-38.
40. Currah & Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions, supra note 33, at 39.
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by transsexuals and reveals that no matter how a transsexual frames
her discrimination claim, it will fail. 41
Courts have decided sex discrimination cases brought by transsexuals
by relying on a "legal distinction between discrimination because of
sex and discrimination because of a change of sex."'42 Smith v. City of
Salem represented the first major departure from this approach. 43
C. Relevant Case Law
This Part recounts seminal Title VII sex discrimination cases involv-
ing transsexual plaintiffs. These cases set the analytical structure-
namely, the distinction between sex and transsexuality-on which
courts typically relied and which Smith explicitly rejected.
1. Not "Within the Scope": Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.
In 1974, Arthur Anderson fired Ramona Holloway, who was bio-
logically male, five months after she revealed she was about to un-
dergo sex change surgery and shortly after changing her name in
Arthur Anderson's employment records.44 Holloway argued that
"sex," as used in Title VII, was "[synonymous] with 'gender,' and gen-
der would encompass transsexuals. ' '45 Arthur Anderson countered
that Congress intended sex to be construed in its "anatomical"
sense. 46 After reviewing the legislative history of Title VII, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted sex by "its plain meaning
.. conclud[ing] that Congress had only the traditional notions of 'sex'
in mind."'47 The court also looked to recent attempts to amend Title
VII to prohibit discrimination based on "sexual preference. ' 48 Al-
though ten such bills were introduced between 1975 and 1977, none
were enacted.49 The court viewed this as strong evidence that Con-
gress had chosen not to broaden the definition of "sex" in Title VII,
despite having had the opportunity to do so. 50 The Ninth Circuit then
41. Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the "Nascent Jurisprudence of
Transsexualism," 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 310 (1997) (quoted in Currah & Minter, Unprin-
cipled Exclusions, supra note 33, at 40).
42. Currah & Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions, supra note 33, at 40; accord Etsitty v. Utah
Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610, at *5 (D. Utah June 24, 2005).
43. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
44. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977). This Note will
refer to plaintiffs using the pronoun forms that their respective courts used.
45. Id. at 662.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. & n.6.
50. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
1106 [Vol. 56:1101
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held that "[a] transsexual individual's decision to undergo sex change
surgery does not bring that individual, [or] transsexuals as a class,
within the scope of Title VII. ''51
2. "Manipulation of Semantics": Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc.
On April 22, 1980, Budget Marketing hired Audra Sommers.5 2 Two
days -later, Budget Marketing fired her, alleging "she misrepresented
herself as an anatomical female. '53 Budget explained that several fe-
male employees had voiced concerns about which restroom Sommers
would use.54 The District Court for the Southern District of Iowa re-
quired Sommers to state "whether she had been discriminated against
because she was male, female, or transsexual. ' 55 In her amended
complaint, Sommers identified herself as "a female with the anatomi-
cal body of a male," who had not yet undergone a sex change opera-
tion.56 Sommers argued that the court was not "bound by the plain
meaning of the term 'sex' . . . [and] should instead expand the cover-
age of [Title VII] to protect individuals ... who are psychologically
female, albeit biologically male."'57 The district court rejected this ar-
gument, noting that other courts had "refused to extend Title VII cov-
erage to those discriminated against because of their transsexuality. ' '58
The court referred to Sommers' description of her sex as a "manipula-
tion of semantics. ' 59 It proceeded to interpret "sex" as the court in
Holloway had, stating that "courts [cannot] ignore anatomical classifi-
cation and determine a person's sex according to the psychological
51. Id. at 664.
52. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 748 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 748-49. A great deal of litigation springs from a transsexual employee being termi-
nated because other employees are uncomfortable having a "man" in a women's restroom, or
vice versa. They justify terminating the employee on this basis, and often claim their decision is
not based on any prejudice against the transgendered. Rather, they argue there is no reasonable
solution to the problem, though the option of a one-toilet bathroom does not seem to have been
seriously considered. See, e.g., Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 03-3344, 98 Fed. App'x 461 (6th Cir.
2004) (per curiam); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610 (D.
Utah June 24, 2005); Dobre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
55. Sommers, 667 F.2d at 749. It is unclear whether the district court judge viewed "transsex-
ual" as describing a third category of sex on par with male and female, or implying "no sex" at
all.
56. Id.
57. Id. The Eighth Circuit seemed to have used the terms "sex" and "gender" interchangea-
bly. See id. at 748-49. However, it is clear from the rest of the opinion that "gender" referred to
biological/anatomical sex, rather than a socially constructed identity. See id. at 750.
58. Id. at 749.
59. Sommers, 667 F.2d at 749. But see Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004)
(amended opinion) (criticizing the district court and City of Salem's use of quotation marks
around the phrase "sex stereotype").
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makeup of that individual. ' 60 Because Sommers had the anatomy of a
man, the district court classified her as a man;61 Title VII, therefore,
did not protect her.62 The district court then granted summary judg-
ment to Budget.63
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision.64 In looking to the legislative history, the Eighth Cir-
cuit found that Congress had created the sex discrimination prohibi-
tion to protect women; there was no indication that Congress had
"any intention to include transsexualism in Title VII. ' '65 The court
also noted Congress's refusal to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimi-
nation based on sexual preference. 66 In closing, the court acknowl-
edged that it was "not unmindful of the problem Sommers faces, '67
but stated that it would be up to the parties to come up with a
solution. 68
3. "From What Remains of a Man": Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc.
Eastern Airlines hired Kenneth Ulane in 1968.69 In 1979, Ulane
was diagnosed with GID 70 and underwent sex change surgery a year
later.71 Subsequently, the Federal Aviation Administration and the
State of Illinois certified her as a female named Karen Ulane. 72 East-
ern Airlines fired Ulane in 1981 after learning of her sex change. 73
Ulane brought suit, and the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois determined that Title VII prohibited discrimination based on a
plaintiff's transsexualism. 74 The district court interpreted "sex" to en-
compass "sexual identity, ' 75 which involved "a question of how soci-
60. Sommers, 667 F.2d at 749.
61. Id.
62. Id. This case was decided before Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,
which held that men were also protected from sex discrimination under Title VII. 462 U.S. 669
(1983).
63. Sommers, 667 F.2d at 749.
64. Id. at 750.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. Given that Budget fired Sommers, it is unlikely that it, or any other employer, would
have much of an incentive to work with Sommers or similarly situated employees in reaching an
accommodation.
69. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1082 (7th Cir. 1984).
70. Id. at 1083.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1084.
74. Id.
75. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084 (internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 56:11011108
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ety perceive[d] the individual. ' 76 Noting that remedial statutes such
as Title VII are to be liberally construed, the district court held that
"sex" applied to transsexuals, even though Congress had not explicitly
said so.77
The Seventh Circuit disagreed, however, holding that "words
should be given their ordinary, common meaning. ' 78 Because Title
VII does not explicitly prohibit "discrimination against a person who
has a sexual identity disorder ... a prohibition against discrimination
based on an individual's sex is not synonymous. ' 79 The court looked
at the sparse legislative history for Title VII's prohibition of sex dis-
crimination: "Congress never considered nor intended that this 1964
legislation apply to anything other than the traditional concept of
sex.... There is not the slightest suggestion in the legislative record
to support an all-encompassing interpretation. ' 80 The Seventh Circuit
agreed with the district court that remedial statutes should be liberally
construed, but noted that the "concept has reasonable bounds beyond
which a court cannot go without transgressing the prerogatives of
Congress." 81
The Seventh Circuit also overruled the district court's finding that
Eastern Airlines discriminated against Ulane based on her status as a
female, holding that the district court did not make sufficient factual
findings to determine that Ulane was actually a woman.8 2 The Sev-
enth Circuit discounted Ulane's claim of being a woman, "even if one
believes that a woman can be so easily created from what remains of a
man."' 83 While holding out the possibility that a transsexual plaintiff
could have a valid Title VII claim based on biological sex,84 the court
held that Eastern Airlines terminated Ulane because she was a
transsexual. 85
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1085.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086.
82. Id. at 1087.
83. Id. It appears that the court believed Ulane had no sex. See Currah & Minter, Unprinci-
pled Exclusions, supra note 33, at 42.
84. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087. For example, a female-to-male transsexual could not make a
claim that he was discriminated against because he was a transsexual, but he could make a claim
that he was discriminated against because he was biologically female.
85. Id.
2007] 1109
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D. A Possible Opening: Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and
Sex Stereotyping
Ann Hopkins worked as an accountant for Price Waterhouse, and
her supervisors recommended her for promotion to partner.86 The
firm, however, placed her nomination on "hold" for a year.87 When
the time came to nominate her again, her supervisors refused. 88 Hop-
kins then brought suit under Title VII, claiming Price Waterhouse dis-
criminated against her based on her sex.89 At trial, Hopkins
supported her claim by presenting the written statement of nomina-
tion made by her supervisors, written comments on her candidacy by
partners, and statements made by her supervising partner.90 The
nominating statement praised Hopkins for her "deft touch" 91 and for
work that was "virtually at the partner level," 92 but some partners de-
scribed her as "macho" 93 and in need of "a course at charm school. '94
They also took issue with "a lady using foul language. ' '95 Hopkins'
supervisor told her that if she were to "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry," she would increase her chances of a
promotion. 96
The Supreme Court ruled for Hopkins, finding Price Waterhouse
had discriminated against her because she did not fulfill stereotypes of
how a woman should look and act. The Court stated, "Congress' in-
tent to forbid employers to take gender into account in making em-
ployment decisions appears on the face of the statute ..... We take
these words to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment
decisions. "97
III. SUBJECT OPINION: SMITH V. CITY OF SALEM
This Part discusses the Sixth Circuit's decision in Smith v. City of
Salem.98 Smith marked the first time a court of appeals allowed the
86. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 233 (1989).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 231-32.
89. Id. at 232.
90. Id. at 232-35.
91. Id. at 234 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id. at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 239-40.
98. See infra notes 99-120.
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Price Waterhouse prohibition of sex stereotyping to extend to a
transsexual plaintiff in a Title VII case.99 Although Smith may, at first
blush, appear to advance equal employment rights for transsexuals, its
relief may be only temporary. Indeed, Smith is premised on both an
incorrect application of Price Waterhouse and an incorrect interpreta-
tion of congressional intent.
A. Facts
Jimmie Smith was a lieutenant and seven-year veteran of the City of
Salem Fire Department. a°° During that time, he had no negative inci-
dents on the job.10' After years of successful service, Smith was diag-
nosed with GID and began "expressing a more feminine appearance
on a full-time basis.' u0 2 His co-workers questioned him about his ap-
pearance and told him that "his appearance and mannerisms were not
'masculine enough."1 0 3 Smith informed his supervisor of his GID
and the treatment plan that he was following, including the likelihood
that he would undergo a "complete physical transformation from male
to female."' 0 4
The City's executive body met on April 18, 2001 to figure out how
to end Smith's employment.10 5 This group decided "to require Smith
to undergo three separate psychological evaluations," and "[t]hey
hoped that Smith would either resign or refuse to comply."'01 6 On
April 26, 2001, the fire chief "suspended Smith for one twenty-four
hour shift" for allegedly violating "a City and/or Fire Department
policy.
''t07
B. Prior History
Following his suspension, Smith sued the City of Salem in the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio, alleging sex discrimina-
99. Interestingly, just weeks before Smith, the Sixth Circuit upheld a district court's dismissal
of a transsexual plaintiffs Title VII claim on the grounds that "Title VII does not prohibit dis-
crimination based on an individual's status as a transsexual," and found that Price Waterhouse
was not applicable. Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 98 Fed. App'x 461, 462 (6th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam). None of the judges deciding Fresh Mark, however, were on the panels that decided
Smith and Barnes; Fresh Mark was an unreported case.
100. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004) (amended opinion).
101. Id.
102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Smith, 378 F.3d at 569.
107. Id.
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tion under Title VII.108 The court characterized Smith's claim as
"disingenuous,"' 0 9 describing his use of the Price Waterhouse sex ster-
eotyping claim "as an end run around his 'real' claim.. . 'based upon
his transsexuality.' "110 The district court ultimately held that "Title
VII does not prohibit discrimination based on an individual's transsex-
ualism." 1 Smith appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which then consid-
ered "whether Smith properly alleged a claim of sex stereotyping, in
violation of ... Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.""' 2
C. Holding
The Sixth Circuit unanimously reversed the district court, finding
Smith had "sufficiently pleaded claims of sex stereotyping and gender
discrimination."1 3 The Sixth Circuit noted that "his failure to con-
form to sex stereotypes concerning how a man should look and be-
have was the driving force behind Defendants' actions."'1 14
The Sixth Circuit refused to follow other courts that had held that a
plaintiff's transsexuality was an absolute bar to Title VII's protection
from sex discrimination.115  Rather, the court invoked Price
Waterhouse: "Title VII protect[s] a woman who failed to conform to
social expectations concerning how a woman should look and behave
... [thus,] Title VII's reference to 'sex' encompasses both the biologi-
cal differences between men and women, and gender discrimination
... based on a failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms."' 1 6
108. Id.
109. Id. at 571.
110. Id.
111. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Smith, 378 F.3d at 571. There were four issues addressed by the Sixth Circuit that will
not be addressed in this Note: (1) whether Smith alleged an adverse employment action; (2)
whether he satisfied all elements necessary to allege a prima facie case of employment discrimi-
nation and retaliation; (3) whether Smith stated a § 1983 claim based on violations of his right to
due process; and (4) whether he stated a § 1983 claim of sex discrimination. Id. at 575-78. The
district court had held that Smith "failed to demonstrate that he suffered an adverse employ-
ment action ... [and that] he failed to state a claim based on the deprivation of a constitutional
or federal statutory right, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 569-70. The Sixth Circuit re-
versed with respect to the adverse employment action, finding that the twenty-four hour suspen-
sion was an adverse employment action. Id. at 576. Although the court affirmed the dismissal of
Smith's § 1983 claim of denial of due process, it reversed on his § 1983 claim of sex discrimina-
tion. Id. at 578.
113. Id. at 572. As to the prima facie element regarding disparate treatment, the complaint
alleged that Smith "would not have been treated differently, on account of his non-masculine
behavior and GID, had he been a woman instead of a man." Smith, 378 F.3d at 570 (emphasis
added).
114. Id. at 572.
115. Id. at 572-73.
116. Id. at 573.
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The Sixth Circuit then held that an employee's failure to abide by the
social constructs of how a man or woman should act was an illegiti-
mate ground for adverse employment action.117 Because Smith al-
leged that he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of his
feminine appearance and mannerisms, he had stated a claim under
Title VII.1 1 8 The court noted that "[s]ex stereotyping based on a per-
son's gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimina-
tion, irrespective of the cause of that behavior."'1 9 Transsexuality,
therefore, would not preclude a Title VII sex discrimination claim.' 20
IV. ANALYSIS
This Part analyzes the key issues raised by the Sixth Circuit in Smith
v. City of Salem: (1) the relationship of "sex" to "gender"; 121 (2) the
extension of Title VII sex discrimination protections to transsexual
plaintiffs in light of their explicit exclusion from the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA; 122 and (3) the circuit split regarding the viability of
sex discrimination claims brought by transsexual plaintiffs.' 23
A. The Relationship of Sex to Gender
Smith turned on the Sixth Circuit's understanding of the relation-
ship between sex and gender. A transsexual person has a biological
117. See id. at 575.
118. Id. at 574-75.
119. Smith, 378 F.3d at 575. The Sixth Circuit rebuked the district court and the City of Salem
for repeatedly placing quotation marks around "sex stereotype," thus implying that sex stere-
otyping lacked "legal relevance." Id.
120. Id. Notably, two months earlier, the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion considerably differ-
ent from the amended opinion that is the subject of this Note. Smith v. City of Salem, 369 F.3d
912 (6th Cir. 2004). In this earlier opinion, the court announced a per se rule that discrimination
based solely on a plaintiff's transsexuality was sufficient for a Title VII sex stereotype complaint:
By definition, transsexuals are individuals who fail to conform to stereotypes about
how those assigned a particular sex at birth should act, dress, and self-identify. Ergo,
identification as a transsexual is the statement or admission that one wishes to be the
opposite sex or does not relate to one's birth sex. Such an admission-for instance the
admission by a man that he self-identifies as a woman and/or that he wishes to be a
woman-itself violates the prevalent sex stereotype that a man should perceive himself
as a man. Discrimination based on transsexualism is rooted in the insistence that sex
(organs) and gender (social classification of a person as belonging to one sex or the
other) coincide. This is the very essence of sex stereotyping.
Id. at 921-22. Without comment, the court abandoned this per se rule, and the reasoning behind
it, in its amended opinion. See Smith, 378 F.3d 566.
121. See infra notes 124-163.
122. See infra notes 164-169.
123. See infra notes 170-182.
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sex and gender that do not match.124 As such, transsexuality is a gen-
der identity issue.125 In order to bring biological sexual characteristics
and gender into accord, a transsexual takes various steps to transition
from living as a male to living as a female, or vice versa. 126 This transi-
tion may include hormone treatments and sex reassignment sur-
gery. 127 Despite these increasingly sophisticated medical advances,
transsexuals retain the biological sex with which they were born; it is
determined by their chromosomes1 28 and remains unaffected by hor-
mone treatment or surgery. 129 Thus, Title VII cases involving
transsexual plaintiffs are more about gender than sex. Congress had
no intention of including gender or transsexuality within the Title VII
sex discrimination provision in 1964 or in subsequent amendments. In
addition, the Sixth Circuit misunderstood the Court's use of "gender"
in Price Waterhouse.
1. Congress's Intention for the Sex Provision in Title VII
Title VII states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer.., to discriminate against any individual... because
of such individual's ... sex.' 130 "Gender" does not appear anywhere
in the text of Title VII, nor is there any mention of transsexuality or
discrimination "against a person who has sexual identity disorder. '131
When the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, "gender" had not even
been introduced into the American legal system as a synonym for
sex, 132 let alone something distinct from biological sex.133 Indeed, the
124. Julie A. Greenberg, What Do Scalia and Thomas Really Think About Sex? Title VII and
Gender Nonconformity Discrimination: Protection for Transsexuals, Intersexuals, Gays and Les-
bians, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 149, 151 (2002).
125. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
126. Samantha J. Levy, Comment, Trans-forming Notions of Equal Protection: The Gender
Identity Class, 12 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 141, 145 (2002).
127. Id. at 145-46. Sex reassignment surgery can be expensive: "The average MTF cost was
about $10,400, and the average FTM surgery ... was about $17,900." See Transgender Network,
The Cost of Transgender Health Benefits, http://www.tgender.net/taw/thbcost.html (last visited
Apr. 30, 2007); Transgender Network, Transgender Health Benefits, http://www.tgender.net/taw/
tsins.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2007).
128. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1083 n.6 (7th Cir. 1984).
129. Id. at 1083 n.5 ("An XX configuration denotes female; XY denotes male. These chromo-
some patterns cannot be surgically altered.").
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
131. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
132. Excerpts from Senate Hearing on the Ginsburg Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1993, at
A20. During her Supreme Court nomination hearings, Ginsburg was asked to tell the story of
how she came up with the term "gender discrimination." She recounted how her secretary
thought the male judges on appellate courts in the 1970s would be "distracted" by the repeated
use of the word "sex." The secretary suggested using the "grammar book term" gender instead,
so to "ward off distracting associations." Id.
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legislative history of Title VII indicates that Congress's intention was
to prohibit discrimination against women. As Representative Smith
explained, the amendment that he proposed added "sex" to the list of
protected classes "to correct the present 'imbalance' which exists be-
tween males and females in the United States.' 1 34 "Sex" had two
common meanings at the time: the act of sexual intercourse and the
physical characteristics that differentiate men from women. 135 The
debate on the sex discrimination provision consisted solely of discus-
sions about the biological differences between men and women. 136 At
no point did Congress discuss the more complex issues of transsexual-
ity and gender.137
Since Title VII was passed, Congress has had multiple opportunities
to amend it to define "sex" more broadly, 138 but it has not done so. In
1972, Congress amended Title VII to strengthen its provisions with
respect to the organization and powers of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission. 139 Congress did not in any way redefine "sex"
in these amendments. In 1978, Congress passed the PDA,'140 which
clarified that employers could not discriminate against women be-
cause of pregnancy or childbirth. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 al-
lowed for parties to request jury trials and to "recover compensatory
and punitive damages in intentional employment discrimination
133. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The word 'gen-
der' has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as
opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive to the sexes.").
134. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 24, at 116.
135. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNA-
BRIDGED 1560 (Harold Whitehall et al. eds., 1951) (defining "sex" as "[t]he distinction between
male and female; that property or character by which an animal is male or female" and as "[o]ne
of the two divisions of animals founded on the distinction of male and female"); id. (defining
"sexual" as "[d]enoting the method of reproduction by sexes").
136. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 24, at 116-17. Representative Emanuel Celler opposed
Smith's amendment, seeing it as a ploy to defeat the Civil Rights Act as a whole. Celler and
Smith then engaged in a discussion "about the biological differences between men and women."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. See generally id. at 100-23.
138. See Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *4 (E.D. La.
Sept. 16, 2002) ("From 1981 through 2001, thirty-one proposed bills have been introduced in the
United States Senate and the House of Representatives which have attempted to amend Title
VII and prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of affectional or sexual orientation.
None have passed.").
139. Milestones in the History of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission:
1991, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/milestones/1991.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2007).
140. See Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (2000)
("The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions .... "A
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cases.' 4 1 When Congress amended the Title VII sex discrimination
provision, it focused exclusively on two matters tied directly to biolog-
ical sex-pregnancy and childbirth. Congress evidently did not be-
lieve the Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane courts had erred in ruling
that Title VII did not prohibit discrimination against transsexuals. 142
Indeed, Congress amended Title VII with the PDA in response to a
Court ruling with which it disagreed.1 43 The logical conclusion is that
Congress was quite content having "sex" understood as a function of
biology.
2. "We Need Not Leave Our Common Sense at the Doorstep": Sex
and Gender in Price Waterhouse and Smith
The Smith decision relied on a definition of gender that is at odds
with the one used by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse. In
Smith, the Sixth Circuit understood gender to mean something along
the lines of "the cultural and attitudinal qualities that are characteris-
tic of a particular sex."'1 44 But the Price Waterhouse Court quite obvi-
ously used "gender" as an interchangeable synonym for "sex," rather
than a distinct concept. 45 The Fourth Circuit noted this in Hopkins v.
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.:146
Because Congress intended that the term "sex" in Title VII mean
simply "man" or "woman," there is no need to distinguish between
the terms "sex" and "gender" in Title VII cases. Consequently,
141. Milestones in the History of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
supra note 139.
142. Courts have long recognized the significance of congressional acquiescence. In Cannon
v. University of Chicago, the Court discussed whether Title IX afforded a private right of action:
[In 1967, a distinguished panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit squarely
decided this issue [regarding Title VI, upon which Title IX was modeled] in an opinion
that was repeatedly cited with approval and never questioned during the ensuing five
years [when Title IX was passed]. In addition, at least a dozen other federal courts
reached similar conclusions in the same or related contexts during those years. It is
always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know
the law; in this case, because of their repeated references to Title VI and its modes of
enforcement, we are especially justified in presuming both that those representatives
were aware of the prior interpretation of Title VI and that that interpretation reflects
their intent with respect to Title IX.
441 U.S. 677, 696-98 (1979) (citations omitted).
143. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976) (holding that an employee benefits
plan that excluded disabilities resulting from pregnancy did not violate Title VII).
144. Greenberg, supra note 124, at 150.
145. Given that most people's biological sex and gender are in accord, this usage by the Court
is understandable and reflects the viewpoint of the majority of society. Transsexuals, whose
biological sex and gender are not in accord, are sensitive to the distinction between sex and
gender.
146. 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996). For clarity, it should be noted that Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas
& Electric Co. and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins involved separate plaintiffs.
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courts, speaking in the context of Title VII, have used the term[s]
"sex" and "gender" interchangeably to refer simply to the fact that
an employee is male or female.1 47
In other words, the Court believed Congress meant Title VII to refer
to "sex" as biological, rather than cultural or attitudinal. This is most
evident in the Price Waterhouse opinion, where the Court wrote that
"Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in
making employment decisions appears on the face of the statute. 1
' 48
Then the Court quoted Title VII directly, 149 as prohibiting discrimina-
tion "because of such individual's . . .sex.' 150 Given that Title VII
uses the word "sex,"'1 51 and makes no use of the word "gender," one
must conclude that the Court simply used gender as a synonym for
"biological sex.' 52
Throughout the Price Waterhouse opinion, the Court used "sex"
and "gender" interchangeably. When the Court attempted to explain
what it meant by "gender play[ing] a motivating part in an employ-
ment decision," it wrote, "if we asked the employer at the moment of
the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful re-
sponse, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee
was a woman."'153 An understanding of sex as biological is at the
foundation of this definition. Before discriminating against a woman
because she is not acting as a woman "should" act (gender), the em-
ployer has to first target the employee's sex: "In the specific context
of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that
a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on
the basis of gender."'1 54 The Court saw sex stereotyping as a subcat-
egory of sex discrimination, where cultural or attitudinal qualities are
evaluated by an employer only after targeting the employee's sex.
Since Price Waterhouse, a number of federal courts have differenti-
ated between sex and gender in this way.155
147. Id. at 749 n.1 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989)).
148. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 239-40.
150. Id. at 240 (second emphasis added) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
152. See supra notes 130-143.
153. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2004) (hold-
ing that Price Waterhouse does not apply to "appearance and grooming standards cases"); Spear-
man v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that "Spearman's co-workers
maligned him because of his apparent homosexuality, and not because of his sex"); Etsitty v.
Utah Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610, at *4-5 (D. Utah June 24, 2005)
(holding that Price Waterhouse was inapplicable because the "drastic action" of a sex change
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The Sixth Circuit's understanding of gender as the cultural and atti-
tudinal qualities of a particular sex made Smith fairly easy to de-
cide.156 The City of Salem, through its agents, took adverse
employment action against Smith once it learned of his intent to un-
dergo a "complete physical transformation from male to female. '157
Given Smith's "feminine" attributes, and because he did not meet
traditional notions of how a man should act and look,158 he failed to
exhibit the traditional cultural and attitudinal qualities that are char-
acteristic of men. The Sixth Circuit compared Smith's situation to that
of Ann Hopkins during her employment at Price Waterhouse and
found them analogous. 159 Just as Hopkins' employers believed she
was unacceptably "macho," 160 the City of Salem believed that Smith
did not act "masculine enough."'161 In each case, the employers took
discriminatory action against their "non-conforming"1 62 employee.
The determination that the City of Salem committed sex discrimina-
tion against Smith, however, was based on an incorrect understanding
of the Supreme Court's definition of "gender." The city did not take
adverse employment action against Smith because he failed to fulfill
stereotypes of how a man should act; it took this action because of his
efforts to change his sex. 163 The city's actions were not predicated on
Smith's biological sex; it did not matter whether Smith was a male or
female. Thus, the City did not discriminate against Smith on the basis
of sex.
"cannot be fairly characterized as a mere failure to conform to stereotypes"); Johnson v. Fresh
Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1000 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (holding that Price Waterhouse did not
apply to transsexuals), affd, 98 Fed. App'x 461 (6th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie
La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (holding that
the termination of a male employee with GID was not prohibited by Title VII). But see
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (relying on Price Waterhouse in holding
that "sex" under Title VII refers to both biological sex and gender).
156. See Greenberg, supra note 124, at 150-51.
157. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004) (amended opinion).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 571-75.
160. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
161. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568 (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id. at 571.
163. Id. at 568. While Smith's co-workers did comment that he was not "masculine enough,"
the City of Salem did not take any action against him until after he informed them of his intent to
go through the complete sex reassignment treatment. Id. There was no evidence in the record
that any of his supervisors took any action against him before learning of his desire to complete
the reassignment treatment. See id.
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B. Congress Has Explicitly Excluded Transsexuals from
Other Civil Rights Statutes
The Sixth Circuit's ruling that Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimi-
nation applies to transsexuals is curious, given that Congress has ex-
plicitly excluded transsexuals from both the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA. These two statutes were enacted nine and twenty-five years
after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, respectively. 164 Congress did not
discuss transsexuality when debating Title VII,165 and at the time Title
VII was passed, "sex" was understood in accordance with its more
traditional definition.166 It makes little sense to believe that Congress
intended for the "sex" provision in Title VII to encompass transsexu-
ality when it explicitly excluded transsexuality from the two disability
acts. Further, Congress lumped transsexuality with pedophilia, exhibi-
tionism, and voyeurism in both disability acts,'1 67 which is strong evi-
dence that Congress was unsympathetic, and even hostile, to the
plight of transsexuals.
Between 1981 and 2000, Congress rejected thirty-one proposals to
amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion. 168 Congress has proved unwilling to explicitly include sexual ori-
entation within Title VII's sex provision and has explicitly excluded
sexual orientation from the protection of subsequent legislation. In
comparison, during this same twenty-year period, it appears no mem-
ber of Congress thought the issue of including transsexuality under
Title VII's sex provision was sufficiently important to propose such
legislation. 169 It is hard to believe, therefore, that Congress intended
to include transsexuality within Title VII.
C. The Circuit Split: What Can Employers and Their Transsexual
Employees Take from Smith?
Smith is noteworthy because it declined to follow the earlier hold-
ings of the Seventh Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and Ninth Circuit.170
Smith creates uncertainty about whether, where, and under what cir-
cumstances transsexuals are protected under Title VII.
164. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000)); Pub. L.
No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)).
165. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
168. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *4 & n.53 (E.D. La.
Sept. 16, 2002).
169. It appears no bills were proposed during this time period to extend Title VII to transsex-
uals. Id. at *4.
170. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572-73 (6th Cir. 2004) (amended opinion).
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Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane held that transsexual employees ter-
minated for being transsexuals have no recourse under Title VII re-
gardless of gender stereotyping. 171 To reach that result, the courts
relied on the legislative history of Title VII and what they considered
to be its plain language. 172 These courts reasoned that discrimination
against a transsexual employee because of the employee's decision to
alter his or her physical appearance is not sex discrimination because
it is not based on the employee's biological sex.173 In other words, the
employer would have taken this adverse action regardless of whether
the employee was a male-to-female or a female-to-male transsexual.
Thus, the argument goes, because the employer's decision was not
based on the employee's biological sex, it cannot, by definition, be sex
discrimination under Title VII.
The Smith decision found this rationale outdated.174 According to
the Sixth Circuit, the reasoning of earlier Title VII cases was "eviscer-
ated"' 175 by Price Waterhouse: "Title VII's reference to 'sex' encom-
passes both the biological differences between men and women, and
gender discrimination, that is, discrimination based on a failure to
conform to stereotypical gender norms. '"176 Therefore, transsexual
employees like Smith must have been discriminated against because
of their failure to live up to stereotypical beliefs about how a man or
woman "should" act.177 This decision, however, creates problems for
both employers and transsexual employees.
First, it creates a conflict in the enforcement of the Title VII sex
discrimination provision. The defendants in both Smith and Barnes v.
City of Cincinnati,178 the Sixth Circuit's most recent Title VII case in-
volving a transsexual plaintiff, were municipalities located solely
171. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977); Sommers v.
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742
F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984).
172. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661-63; Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750; Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084-85.
173. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663 ("The manifest purpose of Title VII's prohibition against sex
discrimination in employment is to ensure that men and women are treated equally, absent a
bona fide relationship between the qualifications for the job and the person's [biological] sex."
(emphasis added)); Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750 ("It is ... generally recognized that the major
thrust of the 'sex' amendment was towards providing equal opportunities for women." (emphasis
added)); Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 ("The phrase in Title VII prohibiting discrimination based on
sex, in its plain meaning, implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against women because they
are women and against men because they are men.").
174. Smith, 378 F.3d at 572-73.
175. Id. at 573.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 574.
178. 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 624 (2005).
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within the circuit. 179 But employers with operations both in and
outside the Sixth Circuit must now utilize two different employment
guidelines regarding transsexual employees.1 80 For example, assume a
company learns it has two transsexual employees, one working in Fort
Wayne, Indiana and the other in Cincinnati, Ohio. The company can
terminate the Fort Wayne employee at will and without fear of losing
a sex discrimination suit, but it cannot do the same to the Cincinnati
employee without the risk of Title VII liability. While these compa-
nies have the option of altering their policies in all their locations,
employers should not be forced to choose between competing inter-
pretations of Title VII.
Perhaps more importantly, this split could mislead transsexual em-
ployees. Transsexual employees in Indiana may read about Smith or
Barnes and think that they are now protected by Title VII. The em-
ployee, however, is still very much unprotected. 181 The split thus cre-
ates problems for both employers and transsexuals. Title VII protects
employees from certain types of discrimination and guides employers
in how they must treat those who work for them. As the law currently
stands, however, neither employers nor transsexual employees know
their rights when it comes to discrimination based on transsexuality.
The Smith decision only protects transsexuals in the Sixth Circuit,
but it remains to be seen whether this decision can stand the test of
time. Recently, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the City of
Cincinnati,182 allowing the Barnes decision to stand. The Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision and the Court's subsequent denial of certiorari allows
the circuit split to remain in effect, and may be seen as denying pro-
tection under Title VII to transsexuals living outside the Sixth Circuit.
V. IMPACT
Contrary to the views of many commentators,18 3 Smith is unlikely to
significantly benefit transsexual plaintiffs in Title VII sex discrimina-
179. Smith, 378 F.3d at 567; Barnes, 401 F.3d at 733.
180. This assumes that their operations outside the Sixth Circuit are not in municipalities or
states with antidiscrimination ordinances and statutes that protect transsexuals. See NAT'L GAY
& LESBIAN TASK FORCE, TRANSGENDER CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, JURISDICTIONS WITH EXPLIC-
ITLY TRANSGENDER-INCLUSIVE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS (2006), http://www.thetaskforce.
org/downloads/reports/fact-sheets/PopJurisdictions_12_06.pdf [hereinafter NAT'L GAY & LES-
BIAN TASK FORCE, JURISDICTIONS].
181. Being fired is not, of course, the only danger facing transsexuals. See Currah & Minter,
Unprincipled Exclusions, supra note 33.
182. Gina Holland, Court to Let Bias Ruling Stand, CINCINNATI POST, Nov. 7, 2005, available
at 2005 WL 18043177.
183. See, e.g., Melinda Chow, Comment, Smith v. City of Salem: Transgendered Jurisprudence
and an Expanding Meaning of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
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tion cases. Outside of the Sixth Circuit, courts have not readily em-
braced Smith's holding regarding Title VII and transsexuals. 184 In
fact, Smith may actually lead to a loss of Title VII protection for
transsexuals. 185 This Part proposes that efforts would be better ex-
pended lobbying for local and state antidiscrimination laws that spe-
cifically protect transsexuals.
A. The Holding in Smith Was Narrow
Regardless of whether the Sixth Circuit's understanding of Price
Waterhouse was correct, the Sixth Circuit's holding in Smith was nar-
row. The decision simply stands for the proposition that a transsexual
plaintiff is not automatically barred from bringing a Title VII sex dis-
crimination claim. 186 Although allowing suits under Title VII is a pos-
itive step for the rights of transsexuals, the Sixth Circuit did not go so
far as to rule that discrimination based on an employee's transsexual-
ity is a per se violation of Title VII.187 At best, Smith puts transsexu-
als on equal footing with other Title VII plaintiffs in sex
discrimination actions. Any Title VII plaintiff must still show that
"(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse
employment action; (3) he was qualified for the position in question;
and (4) he was treated differently from similarly situated individuals
outside of his protected class."'1 88 These elements are essential for all
plaintiffs to prove. The Smith decision merely gives transsexual plain-
tiffs the opportunity to pursue their claim. It certainly does not upend
the world of employment law.
207, 214 (2005) ("The Sixth Circuit's holding and reasoning in Smith represents a significant
victory for transgendered people. By reiterating that discrimination based on both sex and gen-
der is forbidden under Title VII, the court steers transgendered jurisprudence in a more expan-
sive and just direction."); see also Arthur S. Leonard, Sexual Minority Rights in the Workplace,
43 BRANDEIS L.J. 145, 157 (2004); Abigail W. Lloyd, Defining the Human: Are Transgender
People Strangers to the Law?, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 150, 179-80 (2005); Johnny
Lo, Note, Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 11 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIc ANCESTRY L.J. 277,
281 (2005).
184. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610, at *4-5 (D. Utah
June 24, 2005); see also Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-243, 2006 WL 456173
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006).
185. See infra notes 215-225 and accompanying text.
186. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (amended opinion) ("[A] label,
such as 'transsexual,' is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has suffered
discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity. Accordingly, we hold that Smith
has stated a claim for relief pursuant to Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination.").
187. See supra notes 113-120 and accompanying text.
188. Smith, 378 F.3d at 570 (citing Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 2000)).
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B. Other Courts Have Had Mixed Reactions to Smith's Reasoning
Regarding Transsexual Plaintiffs in Title VII Cases
Since the Sixth Circuit announced the Smith and Barnes decisions,
the response from other courts has been mixed. These cases have
mostly been cited by courts outside the Sixth Circuit in reference to
issues unrelated to whether Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimina-
tion applies to transsexuals. 189 Three other cases more on point with
Smith and Barnes represent this mixed response.
In Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, the District Court of Utah criti-
cized and ultimately rejected Smith's reasoning.190 Etsitty, a transsex-
ual employee, alleged that the Transit Authority terminated her from
her position as a bus driver shortly after she told her supervisor that
she was a transsexual. 191 The district court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the Transit Authority, holding that Etsitty could not
make a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII.192 The
court concluded that transsexuals are not protected under Title VII,193
and specifically repudiated the reasoning in Smith.194 In addition to
preferring the Ulane approach, the court disagreed with the Sixth Cir-
cuit's belief that the sex stereotyping rule from Price Waterhouse ap-
plied in cases involving transsexual plaintiffs: 95
There is a huge difference between a woman who does not behave
as femininely as her employer thinks she should, and a man who is
attempting to change his sex and appearance to be a woman. Such
drastic action cannot be fairly characterized as a mere failure to
conform to stereotypes. 1 96
189. See Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 213, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (Title VII sex
discrimination case involving a lesbian plaintiff in which the court quoted Smith's restatement of
the Price Waterhouse rule regarding sex stereotypes); Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 969 (D. Kan. 2005) (Title IX case citing Smith in a string cite of
cases dealing with same-sex harassment); EEOC v. Grief Bros. Corp., No. 02-CV-468S, 2004 WL
2202641, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004) (quoting Smith as an example of a court following
Price Waterhouse); Manago v. Barnhart, 321 F. Supp. 2d 559, 561 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (disability
insurance benefits case involving a transsexual plaintiff citing Smith in a string cite of decisions
"expanding" the legal protections of transsexuals).
190. No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610 (D. Utah June 24, 2005).
191. Id. at *1.
192. Id. at *7.
193. Id. at *3-4.
194. Id. at *4.
195. Id. at *4-6.
196. Etsitty, 2005 WL 1505610, at *5. The court's opinion then addresses some far-fetched
scenarios. If transsexuals were to be found protected under Title VII's sex provision, the court
wrote, workplace rules involving an employee's sex in any way (such as dress codes) would
constitute sex discrimination against transsexual and nontranssexual employees alike. Thus, the
court opined, "[Tlhere is no social custom or practice associated with a particular sex that is not
a stereotype. And if that is the case, then any male employee could dress as a woman, appear
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In short, the Etsitty court rejected the Sixth Circuit's strained reason-
ing for expanding the scope of the sex provision in Title VII.
On the other end of the spectrum, Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm,
Inc.197 approvingly cited both Smith and Barnes for their reliance on
Price Waterhouse. The district court rejected the Ulane line of cases 198
and denied the defendant's 12(b)(6) motion, ruling that the plaintiff
had sufficiently pleaded claims of gender discrimination based on sex
stereotypes. 199 The court relied on Price Waterhouse and cited Smith
and Barnes for support.2°° Regardless of the eventual outcome of
Mitchell, it is significant because it is the only case outside the Sixth
Circuit to rely on Smith and Barnes in the nearly two years since Smith
was decided.
Lastly, the case of Schroer v. Billington20 warrants attention. In
March 2006, Judge James Robertson went beyond Smith's reasoning
in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, 20 2 holding that discrimi-
nation against a transsexual job applicant based on that person's
transsexuality is per se sex discrimination under Title VII.20 3 While
the district court did not cite Smith, its holding was reminiscent of the
earlier, but ultimately withdrawn, Smith opinion, which had come to a
similar conclusion. 2°4 The plaintiff in Schroer was Diane Schroer, a
male-to-female transsexual who applied for, and was offered, "a posi-
tion as a terrorism research analyst with the Congressional Research
Service (CRS), an arm of the Library of Congress. '20 5 Schroer "was
highly qualified for the position. ' 20 6 She interviewed for the position
and act as a woman." Id. The court acknowledged that it was taking the Smith decision to an
extreme, but it is curious that a court of law would use this as an example of the shortcomings of
the sex-stereotype theory. Even if large numbers of nontranssexual men would go against the
dominant social norms and wear women's clothing, women frequently wear pants (traditionally
male clothing), and the republic still stands. One must also remember the Transit Authority
terminated Etsitty out of concern over which restroom she would use, and whether it would face
any liability if she used a women's restroom. Id. at *2-6. It appears that the Transit Authority
made no attempt to work with Etsitty to provide restroom accommodations for her. See id. at
*2; see also supra note 54.
197. No. Civ.A. 05-243, 2006 WL 456173 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006).
198. Id. at *2.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006).
202. Id. at 205.
203. See id. at 213.
204. See supra note 120.
205. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 205-06.
206. Id. at 205. Before her transition into a female, Schroer served in the U.S. Army for
twenty-five years, much of it in the Special Forces. She also graduated from the prestigious
National War College and Army Command and General Staff College, and earned master's
degrees in history and international relations. Id. at 205-06. The last seven-and-a-half years of
1124 [Vol. 56:1101
SMITH v. CITY OF SALEM
as a man and disclosed her transsexuality after accepting the posi-
tion.207 The next day, CRS withdrew its offer, "given [Schroer's] cir-
cumstances. ' 20 8 Schroer filed suit "alleging sex discrimination under
Title VII.' '209 The court found that Smith, as well as other sex stereo-
type cases that did not involve transsexuals, overstated the Supreme
Court's holding in Price Waterhouse.210 The court rejected Smith's
reasoning regarding sex stereotyping as it applied to Schroer:
"[Schroer sought] to express [a] female identity, not as an effeminate
male, but as a woman. She does not wish to go against the gender
grain, but with it. ' '21 1
The court found that Schroer did not face discrimination based on
sex stereotypes: "Rather, her problems stem[med] from the Library's
intolerance toward a person like her, whose gender identity does not
match her anatomical sex. a212 The court suggested that the district
court's decision in Ulane, which the Seventh Circuit reversed, served
as a better justification for extending Title VII protections to transsex-
uals: "[I]t may be time to revisit Judge Grady's conclusion in [Ulane]
that discrimination against transsexuals because they are transsexuals
is 'literally' discrimination 'because of... sex." 213 In other words, the
court was advocating, albeit in dicta, a per se rule similar to the one
the Sixth Circuit flirted with in the first Smith opinion. Such an ap-
proach could actually lead to a loss of Title VII protections for
transsexuals. 214
C. Smith May Lead to a Loss of Title VII Protection
for Transsexuals
To the extent there is concern in America over so-called judicial
activism,215 efforts to expand Title VII through litigation could back-
her Army career were spent with the U.S. Special Operations Command, which conducts opera-
tions against terrorist organizations. Id. In addition, the Bush Administration had appointed
her to direct an organization which "trackled] and target[ed] high-threat international terrorist
organizations." Id. at 206.
207. Id.
208. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 206 (alteration in original).
209. Id. at 207.
210. Id. at 209.
211. Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 212 (second alteration in original) (quoting Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp.
821, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1983), vacated, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984)).
214. See infra notes 215-225.
215. Martha Neil, Half of U.S. Sees "Judicial Activism Crisis," A.B.A. J. EREPORT, Sept. 30,
2005, http://www.abanet.org/journal/redesign/s30survey.html.
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fire. It could, in fact, lead to federal legislation prohibiting protection
for transsexuals under Title VII or other federal civil rights laws.
Debates over the last ten years regarding same-sex marriage have
shown that the notion of Congress passing such legislation is not far-
fetched. On Election Day 2004, for example, voters in eleven states
approved amendments to their state constitutions explicitly outlawing
same-sex marriages. 216 With Texas approving a similar amendment in
November 2005, twenty-two states now have these constitutional
amendments. 217 Overall, forty-four states ban same-sex marriage, ei-
ther by constitutional amendment or by statute.21 8 The gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) community has a fairly strong po-
litical presence in local, state, and national politics, 21 9 and recent polls
demonstrate a growing acceptance of homosexuality. 220 Nonetheless,
the states that approved the 2004 amendments did so with an average
of seventy percent of the vote.221 In contrast, with the exceptions of
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Jersey, no state explicitly
permits same-sex marriage or civil unions.222 If the GLBT community
and its allies are not able to convince voters and legislatures that
same-sex marriage should be legal, it is unrealistic to expect that the
transsexual community can convince Congress to amend Title VII to
protect transsexuals. 223 Moreover, there is little for a member of Con-
gress to gain politically by supporting such legislation.
216. Lisa Anderson, Faith Takes Key Role in Political Landscape, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 2004, at
Al. In November 2006, however, Arizona voters narrowly rejected just this type of constitu-
tional amendment, but Arizona still has a statute that outlaws same-sex marriage. Monica Da-
vey, Liberals Find Rays of Hope on Ballot Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at P16.
217. John M. Broder, In a Rebuke of Governor, California Voters Reject Spending Cap, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at A24; National Conference of State Legislatures, Same-Sex Marriage
(Jan. 2007), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm.
218. National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 217.
219. For example, the Human Rights Campaign, "a civil rights organization working to
achieve gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender equality," has a self-reported membership of
600,000. Human Rights Campaign, About HRC, Our Misson, What We Do, http://www.hrc.org/
Template.cfm?Section=aboutLHRC (last visited Apr. 30, 2007).
220. See, e.g., James Ricci & Patricia Ward Biederman, Acceptance of Gays on Rise, Polls
Show, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at B1. The American Enterprise Institute compiled polling
data from 1977 to 2003, which revealed a growing acceptance of homosexuality amongst the
American population. Id. A sample question was, "Do you think homosexuals should or should
not be hired for each of the following occupations?" Id. In June 1977, 27% of Americans felt
homosexuals should be hired as elementary school teachers. By May 2003, that number had
risen to 61%. Likewise, in June 1977, only 51% felt homosexuals should be allowed in the
armed forces, but that figure increased to 80% by May 2003. Id.
221. Anderson, supra note 216.
222. Pam Belluck, Advocates Hail a Triumph for Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at
Al.
223. See Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *4 n.54
(E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002).
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If other circuits begin to follow Smith, it is possible that Congress
may respond by passing legislation that limits the definition of "sex"
within Title VII to biological sex. Congress could also follow the ex-
ample set in the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA and amend Title
VII to explicitly exclude transsexualism, transvestitism, and homosex-
uality.224 Transsexual citizens, as a group or individually, simply do
not have the political or economic power to effectively fight such leg-
islation.225 An explicit exclusion of transsexuality under Title VII's
"sex" provision would destroy the Title VII protection that may arise
out of Smith, and would preclude any other legal theory that would
protect transsexuals under Title VII.
D. Lobbying for Local Legislation May Be More Effective than
Title VII Litigation
A slower, but perhaps ultimately more successful, strategy for
transsexuals would be to focus lobbying efforts at the municipal,
county, and state level. Such efforts already have resulted in antidis-
crimination statutes and ordinances with transgender-inclusive an-
tidiscrimination provisions in nine states, the District of Columbia,
and eighty-one localities.2 26 Notably, twenty municipalities and coun-
ties in the so-called Red States have passed transgender-inclusive or-
dinances.2 27 In fact, statewide statutes of this type are in effect in
three states with Republican governors, and nine states with Republi-
can governors have municipalities with transgender-inclusive antidis-
crimination ordinances. 228 Together, these statutes cover approxi-
224. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
226. NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, TRANSGENDER LAW & POLICY INST., SCOPE
OF EXPLICITLY TRANSGENDER-INCLUSIVE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS (2006), http://WWW.
transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/index.htm#jurisdictions [hereinafter NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK
FORCE, SCOPE].
227. Id. These municipalities and counties are located in Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Ohio, and Texas. In addition, Indiana and Kentucky, as well as
the cities of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, Decatur, Georgia, and Pine Lake, Georgia prohibit
discrimination in public employment on the basis of gender identity and expression. Id.
228. The following is a list of Republican governors of states with transgender antidiscrimina-
tion statutes or which contain municipalities with transgender antidiscrimination ordinances:
Arnold Schwarzenegger, California; Charlie Crist, Florida; Sonny Perdue, Georgia; Linda Lin-
gle, Hawaii; Mitch Daniels, Indiana; Ernie Fletcher, Kentucky; Tin Pawlenty, Minnesota; Don-
ald Carcieri, Rhode Island; and Rick Perry, Texas. See NAT'L GOVERNORS Ass'N, GOVERNORS
OF THE AMERICAN STATES, COMMONWEALTHS AND TERRITORIES (2007), available at http://
www.nga.org/Files/pdf[BIOBOOK.pdf. Before the 2006 elections, this number stood at four-
teen. Colorado, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio changed from Republican gov-
ernors to Democrats in the 2006 elections. CNN, America Votes, http://www.cnn.com/
ELECTION/2006/pages/results/governor/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2007).
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mately ninety-four million people, or about 34% of the country's
population.229
There are several advantages to working on the local level. First,
taking a legislative approach may quell any resistance to these laws
based on claims of judicial activism. 230 Such an approach would have
an increased air of legitimacy about it, given the current suspicion of
federal and state courts interpreting legislation beyond the "plain
meaning" of the text.231 Indeed, the Republican Party has made judi-
cial conservatism a centerpiece of their political philosophy: "Recent
events have made it clear that these [activist] judges threaten
America's dearest institutions and our very way of life. '2 32 By work-
ing within the legislative process on the local and state level, support-
ers of transgendered-inclusive antidiscrimination laws will be better
able to avoid turning this issue into a national debate. Again, one
need only look to the same-sex marriage controversy to see that a
national debate on transsexual rights would most assuredly result in a
defeat for transsexual citizens.233 Working on the local and state level
has succeeded, however, as illustrated by the passage of antidis-
crimination laws.234
Second, after these local and state statutes have become more com-
mon, federal and state courts may be less inclined to view discrimina-
tion against transsexuals as being outside the scope of statutes like
Title VII. Indeed, several recent shifts in the Supreme Court's juris-
prudence have rested in part on the changing state of laws, which the
Court felt reflected current social norms.235 Congress may be less apt
to pass legislation that explicitly excludes transsexuals if such laws are
229. NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, JURISDICTIONS, supra note 180.
230. See Neil, supra note 215.
231. See id.
232. REPUBLICAN PARTY, 2004 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM: A SAFER WORLD AND A
MORE HOPEFUL AMERICA 76 (2004), available at http://www.gop.com/media/2004platform.pdf.
233. See supra notes 216-223 and accompanying text.
234. See NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, SCOPE, supra note 226.
235. For instance, Roper v. Simmons held that the execution of prisoners who were minors
when they committed their crimes violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments:
[Tihe objective indicia of consensus in this case-the rejection of the juvenile death
penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on
the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice-provide
sufficient evidence that today our society views juveniles ... as "categorically less cul-
pable than the average criminal."
543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)); accord Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (invalidating a law forbidding sodomy between consenting
homosexual adults and noting that "the 25 States with laws prohibiting... [sodomy] are reduced
now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct"); Atkins, 536 U.S. at
316 ("[A] national consensus has developed against [the execution of mentally retarded
prisoners].").
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fairly common, especially in their own states. If, however, this at-
tempt at interpreting Title VII to include transsexuality becomes a
contentious national debate, few members of Congress would see any
political gain to be had by supporting such a measure. Accordingly, a
legislative approach at state and local levels is preferable to federal
Title VII litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The lack of a broad definition for "sex" as used within Title VII has
resulted in courts dismissing Title VII sex discrimination claims
brought by transsexual plaintiffs, regardless of whether they were al-
leging discrimination because of their sex or because of their transsex-
uality. The Sixth Circuit now defines "sex" to include transsexuality,
and has held that a plaintiff's transsexuality is not a bar to stating a
claim for sex discrimination under Title VII.236 It is the only federal
circuit to do so, and the Supreme Court has refused to review these
decisions.237 The legislative history of Title VII's sex discrimination
provision and the understanding of the word "sex" that was common
at the time Title VII was passed strongly indicate that Congress had
no intention of including transsexuality within the sex provision. Fur-
thermore, any victories by transsexual plaintiffs because of the Sixth
Circuit's ruling could prove to be pyrrhic. A continued strategy of
Title VII litigation could lead to a backlash in Congress, which in turn
could lead to a complete preclusion of Title VII sex discrimination
claims by transsexuals. Widespread suspicion of so-called judicial
activism and broad statutory interpretation could result in congres-
sional legislation explicitly excluding transsexuality from the defini-
tion of "sex" within Title VII. For a community of citizens so poorly
protected by government at all levels, such a result would be
disastrous.
While Smith's and Barnes's litigation efforts were surprisingly suc-
cessful, it is unlikely that future transsexual plaintiffs outside the Sixth
Circuit will win. Even if they do, such individual victories could prove
fleeting in the long run. Instead of pursuing a litigation strategy in the
federal courts, supporters of employment rights for transsexuals may
find more permanent success in lobbying for municipal and state stat-
236. See Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 624
(2005); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (amended opinion).
237. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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utes that explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of
transsexuality.
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